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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MATTHEW HOLT*

I. INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico courts dealt with a number of criminal procedure
issues during the Survey year. Most cases simply reiterated established
law and applied it to a new set of facts. In several cases, however, the
courts explored new areas and changed the law significantly. Several
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court that may have a pronounced effect on future New Mexico decisions also are discussed.
The cases decided fall into no easy categories. The first half of this
article deals with cases construing the United States Constitution; the
cases are divided by the section of the Constitution with which they deal.
The second half of the article deals with non-constitutional aspects of
criminal procedure.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT

A. Probable Cause to Issue a Search Warrant
Decisions by the appellate courts of New Mexico during the Survey
year have not radically altered the requirements of previous cases.' The
decisions suggest, however, that the courts will be much more liberal in
finding that a magistrate's grant of a search warrant was proper than they
have been in the past. This new deference seems to be spawned by a
distaste for the exclusionary rule itself.2
In State v. Snedeker,3 the New Mexico Supreme Court found that a
search warrant issued to search the home of the former President of
Western New Mexico University (WNMU) was valid. A search pursuant
to the warrant led to the discovery of some 12,000 rounds of ammunition,
as well as a great deal of paraphernalia for a variety of different weapons.
Based on this and other evidence, the grand jury indicted Snedeker on
*Associate, Sager, Curran, Sturges, & Tepper, P.C.
I. A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court may, however, have radically changed
the law. The Court in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) abandoned the Aguilar/Spinelli rule
for determining probable cause. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
2. The exclusionary rule simply requires that any evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights may not be introduced into evidence against him. Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. 99 N.M. 286, 657 P.2d 613 (1982).
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twenty-two counts of making false public vouchers. 4 The trial court decided that the affidavit upon which the warrant was issued did not show
probable cause and suppressed the evidence. 5 The state appealed and the
court of appeals affirmed the suppression. The New Mexico Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the courts below.
The Supreme Court's opinion described the case at some length. It
noted that the investigating officer found that a great deal of ammunition
was being purchased by WNMU, ostensibly for use by campus security.
His investigation showed, however, that campus security had never requested nor received the ammunition, and further, that it did not even
have weapons capable of using some of the ammunition. The investigating
officer also charged that Snedeker personally had received the ammunition, but no basis was given to substantiate that charge. Nonetheless, the
court held that the magistrate could fairly infer such a finding.
In finding that this information showed probable cause to believe that
Snedeker had used university monies to purchase goods for himself, the
court did not create new or unusual law. It did, however, explicitly
recognize that a magistrate need not rely solely on the information in the
affidavit, but that he might also make reasonable inferences from the
information given. The court cited several cases defining inferences, and
noted that inferences might properly be drawn from circumstantial evidence. 6 The court also observed that the officer had obtained purchase
orders and warrants. 7 Based on this information, the court concluded that
the magistrate could infer that the officer had read the documents and
had gleaned from them the name of the person who had signed the receipts
for the delivery of the property.8
The court's analysis that a magistrate can draw an inference is correct,
but the particular inference made in this case is troublesome. Purchase
orders and warrants are simply authorizations to pay money for certain
goods. Authorizing payment is inherent in the very nature of the job of
a university president. The fact that Snedeker authorized such payments
is a far step from a conclusion that he personally received delivery. The
4. Snedeker apparently used University funds to purchase the seized evidence. The ammunition
was ordered by and delivered to Snedeker over a three-year period, 1977-1980. Id. at 287, 657 P.2d
at 614.
5. Id. at 288, 657 P.2d at 615. Additional evidence against Snedeker was found during a second
search. The warrant for the latter search was obtained as a result of observations made during the
first search. Under the "fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine, the second search could be found valid
only if the first search was proper. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The trial
court accordingly suppressed the evidence from the later search.
6. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 90 N.M. 414, 564 P.2d 619 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977); Gray v. E.J. Longyear Co., 78 N.M. 161, 429
P.2d 359 (1967).
7. 99 N.M. at 291, 657 P.2d at 618.
8. Id.
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court held, however, that the magistrate could infer that the officer had
found the president's signature on the receipts for delivery9 because the
officer had obtained warrants "along with supporting documents for the
purchase[s]. "'"
The court's reason for finding a permissable inference in Snedeker,
and the real import of the case, is the obvious distaste the court expressed
for the exclusionary rule." Citing Stone v. Powell,'2 the court noted that
the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but a judicially
created remedy to safeguard fourth amendment rights through the rule's
deterrent effect. "3Quoting from Powell, the court stated that the policies
of the rule are not absolute but "must be evaluated in light of competing
policies."' 4 The court in Snedeker obviously found that, on balance,
Snedeker's rights should succumb to those of the public.
The import of Snedeker, therefore, is that the court will stretch to
validate a search that discloses evidence of guilt whenever it can. Relying
on Powell, the court found that an oft stated purpose of the rule, that of
preserving judicial integrity, 5 no longer was to be considered. As to the
second purpose of the rule, that of deterring illegal police practices, the
court made it clear that it thought that such a purpose was based on
"speculations and unsubstantiated assumptions," 6 which should bow to
the more concrete concepts underlying the punishment of the guilty.' 7
The court of appeals applied the teachings of Snedeker in State v.
Lopez 8 to uphold the validity of a search warrant issued in connection
with a fatal hit and run collision. The information available to the court
N

9. Id. at 291, 657 P.2d 618.
10. Id. at 287, 657 P.2d at 614.
11.The court explained the purpose and social cost of the exclusionary rule at length, obviously
finding that the costs usually outweighed the benefits. Id. at 288-89, 657 P.2d 615-16.
12. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
13. Snedeker, 99 N.M. at 289, 657 P.2d at 616. The Court in Powell had reviewed, at length,
the ostensible purposes of the rule. Two principle reasons always have justified the rule: first, it
would deter abuses of the police power; and second, use of "tainted" evidence in trials would make
the courts accomplices in the violation of the Constitution. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). The Court in Powell, however, stated that the concept of "preserving the integrity of
the judicial process ...has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative
evidence." Powell, 428 U.S. at 485 (footnote omitted).
14. 99 N.M. at 289, 657 P.2d at 616.
15. See supra note 14.
16. 99 N.M. at 289, 657 P.2d at 616 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500 (1976) (Burger,
C. J., concurring)).
17. This position is best explained by referring to the language of the court itself:
To hold that this search warrant is invalid would be to compound the toll that is
being taken on society and on the integrity of the courts by an absolutist application
of the exclusionary rule. Some of our judges have quite obviously been intimidated
by the supposed constitutional mandates and have applied loose logic and rubberstamp reactions when any small item appeared to be wrong.
99 N.M. at 292, 657 P.2d at 619.
18. 99 N.M. 791, 664 P.2d 989 (Ct. App. 1982).
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at the time it issued the warrant indicated that Frank Taylor, the investigating officer, responded to a hit and run accident involving a motorcycle. On the way to the scene, a blue pick-up truck ran him off the road.
Taylor later found debris from the vehicle that struck the motorcycle,
including a headlamp, at the scene of the accident. Other information
included an examination of the decedent and the motorcycle that revealed
chips of blue paint from the striking vehicle, and the statement of a
bartender describing two men who had been in his bar near the scene of
the accident until thirty minutes before the collision and who left driving
a blue pick-up truck. "Crime Stoppers" also received information that
corroborated the bartender's statement. The caller gave the full name of
one of the men, and "Ray" for the second.
Based on this information, Taylor checked with local police in Deming.
They told him a Raymond Lopez fit the physical description of one of
the men, and that he owned a blue truck. Taylor went to Lopez's home;
no one was there, but Taylor saw a tailgate from a blue Chevrolet truck
leaning against the garage door. Taylor peered through a crack in the
door and saw a truck parked in the garage. Based on this information,
the magistrate issued a search warrant for Lopez's garage.
On appeal, the court upheld the warrant, finding that though the affidavit
did not describe direct evidence of criminal activity, the circumstances
did show probable cause to believe the evidence of a crime could be
found. The court rejected an attack on the "Crime Stopper's" tip, noting
that despite the fact that the credibility of the tip and of the informant
were not set out in the affidavit, the information was corroborated by
information from the Deming police and by Taylor's observation. From
that information, the magistrate could infer the credibility of the informant
and his tip.
The supreme court's decisions in Snedeker and Lopez show a trend
towards upholding search warrants. This trend, however, will be curbed
by the specific limits imposed by the court of appeals' application of the
Aguilar/Spinelli test in Lopez. In Illinois v. Gates,19 however, the United
States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar/Spinelli test, allowing an
even more lax review of the issuance of search warrants.
The defendants in Gates were indicted for the possession of marijuana,
which police officers found in their automobile and in their home pursuant
to a search warrant. The police received an anonymous letter accusing
the defendants of dealing in drugs. It stated that they traded in drugs by
having one defendant drive from Chicago to Florida, leaving the car to
be loaded with drugs. The other defendant would then fly to Florida and
19. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Though the United States Supreme Court has abandoned the Aguilarl
Spinelli test, New Mexico is still bound by its dictates. See N.M. R. Crim. P. 16.
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drive the drug-laden car back to Chicago. The letter further stated the
specific date of the next Florida trip.
The police verified the tip by finding that the parties named in the letter
did live at the address stated in the letter; that one of the defendants flew
from Chicago to Florida on or about the date specified in the letter,
checked into a room registered in the name of the other defendant, and,
the next morning, left with an unidentified woman in a car with Illinois
plates, driving towards Chicago.2" Based on the above facts, a magistrate
issued a search warrant for the defendants' house and automobile.
The state court ordered that marijuana found pursuant to the search
warrant should be excluded from trial.' It based its decision on the fact
that the letter alone could not support a probable cause determination. In
this regard the United States Supreme Court agreed. Further, the state
court held that the corroboration offered by the police did not meet the
two-pronged test of Aguilar/Spinelli. In Gates, the Supreme Court held
otherwise.
The Court in Gates agreed that the considerations embodied in the
Illinois court's interpretation of Aguilar/Spinelli were "highly relevant."
The Court noted, however, that they should not be viewed as separate,
rigid, or dispositive. The Court instead held that a "totality of the circumstances" analysis should be employed. Under such an analysis, the
magistrate could make a "balanced assessment of the relative weights of
all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip ...
.

"22

The Court offered a variety of justifications for this analysis, including
the argument that it more fairly allowed a magistrate free access to all
relevant information, and would be easier to apply. The Court also found
that such a test would help compensate for the fact that affidavits are
drawn by non-lawyers, would encourage officers to apply for warrants
instead of engaging in warrantless searches (and thereby increase the
illusion of lawfulness), and would facilitate the police's function of protecting the public.2 3
B. Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Although a warrant generally is required before police can search a
person or his property, the courts have carved a number of exceptions
into this rule. In five cases decided during the Survey year, the court of
appeals found the requirements for at least one of the exceptions, the
20. The license plates on the Mercury were registered as belonging to an American Motors car
owned by the defendants. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2330.
23. Id. at 2331.
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"plain view" doctrine, to be satisfied. In State v. Powell,2 4 the first of
these cases, the court explained the nature and application of that doctrine.
In Powell, a police officer who suspected that the driver was drunk
stopped a truck in which the defendant was a passenger.25 The driver
stepped out of the truck and approached the officer. The officer smelled
no odor of alcohol and thought the driver's movements normal. This
satisfied the officer that the driver was not intoxicated.26 The officer then
walked to the truck and looked in it.27 He noted two passengers in the
truck, and, in a crevice in the ceiling, a baggie that "contained a green
leafy substance." He asked the defendant to hand it to him. The officer
satisfied himself that the substance was marijuana and placed all three
under arrest. As he radioed for assistance, he saw the defendant throw
something away. A search found the defendant had thrown away bags of
cocaine. The officer subsequently charged the defendant with possession
with intent to distribute.
The trial court ruled the officer obtained the cocaine as the result of a
warrantless and unjustified search into the truck, and suppressed both the
cocaine and the marijuana. On appeal, the state argued that the marijuana
was in the "plain view" of the officer and hence he did not require a
warrant to search the truck. The court of appeals agreed and reversed.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that "plain'view" has two
meanings in fourth amendment cases. The first and most common meaning, inapplicable in Powell, refers to items seen by an officer who is
legally in a place from which he can see the goods pursuant to a search
warrant or another exception to the warrant requirement.2 8 The Supreme
Court has placed limits on the material that may be seized as a result of
this type of a "plain view" search. In order to be seizable, the goods
must not only have been seen from a vantage point where the officer had
a lawful right to be, but the viewing must have been inadvertent.2 9 This
24. 99 N.M. 381, 658 P.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1983).
25. The officer had observed the truck weaving across the center line of the road and almost off
the pavement on the right. The trial court made no ruling as to the validity of the stop, but, as the
court of appeals noted, the only evidence showed the stop was valid. Id. at 382, 658 P.2d at 457.
26. Id. at 383, 658 P.2d at 458.
27. The officer testified that he did so because he knew there were passengers in the truck and
he wanted to ensure his own safety. The trial court did not accept this explanation, noting that he
had better ways to protect himself. The court of appeals held that it could not rule that the trial
court's view of this evidence was erroneous. Id. at 383, 658 P.2d at 458.
28. Id. at 384, 658 P.2d at 459 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); and
State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980)).
29. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-72 (1971). The Court in Coolidge had a
third requirement, that the items seized "clearly" be evidence of a crime. It was not involved in
Powell because that requirement deals with seizure and not search. This requirement, however, was
recently modified in Texas v. Brown, 51 U.S.L.W. 4361 (U.S. April 19, 1983). The Court in Brown
held the third requirement to be too strict; that items were properly seized if the officer had probable
cause to believe they were connected with criminal activity. Id.
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requirement is designed to prevent officers from circumventing the law
by entering the property of another on one basis, so it may effect a search
for specific items.
The second meaning of "plain view" deals with goods that can be seen
by an officer who is lawfully where he is, not because of an exigency or
warrant, but simply because any person would have a right to be there.
The distinction between the two meanings is subtle yet important: in the
first there is a "search" because the goods are somewhere that has an
expectation of privacy; in the second there is no such expectation and
hence no "search." 3 The police are not limited by the "inadvertency"
rule of the first type of "plain view," because there is no search; they
are free to look for any evidence that is in open view.
The court held that the observations of the officer in Powell fell within
this second definition. Even though the purpose of the valid stop was
completed, the officer still could look into the truck without his viewing
constituting a search for fourth amendment purposes. Relying on Coolidge
v. New Hampshire,3 the court held that the single concern was whether
the officer had a "legitimate reason for being present." Having found the
lawfully could
truck was stopped lawfully, the court found that the officer
32
look into it and see what was exposed to open view.
The second and third cases dealing with the "plain view" doctrine,
State v. Williams33 and State v. Foreman,34 dealt with inventory searches.
The defendant in Williams was arrested during the commission of an
armed robbery. The police searched him and found a set of car keys. The
keys fit a car in the parking lot of the store he was robbing; the police
searched the car and found evidence that later was used against him. In
Foreman, the defendant's truck was stopped by the police and the defendant arrested on an outstanding warrant. The truck then was searched
and, in a closed shoe box, the police found cocaine, paraphernalia, and
a gun. In both cases, the court allowed the findings into evidence on the
theory that they were the product of a valid inventory search and hence
in "plain view."
30. Quoting from 1 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure, § 2.2, pp. 242-43 (1978), the court in Powell
noted the first meaning is deserving of a different name, as the items are not really in plain view.
An item truly found in plain view:
has been left in an 'open field' or similar nonprotected area .... In [such an
instance] there has been no search at all because of the plain view character of
the situation, and this means that the observation is lawful without the necessity
of establishing either pre-existing probable cause or the existence of a search
warrant or one of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement.
99 N.M. at 384, 658 P.2d at 459.
31. 403 U.S. 433 (1971).
32. 99 N.M. at 385, 658 P.2d at 460. See also Cook v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 71, 216 S.E.2d
48 (1975).
33. 97 N.M. 634, 642 P.2d 1093 (1982).
34. 97 N.M. 583, 642 P.2d 186 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982).
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The decisions in Foreman and Williams raise two concerns regarding
inventory searches. The first is the propriety of an inventory search under
the circumstances; the second is the failure to obtain a warrant after
discovery of the evidence, but prior to seizing it.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that an inventory search
executed in conformance with established procedures is valid when the
vehicle is lawfully impounded.3 5 The purpose of the inventory is to protect
the owner of the car so as to make his valuables secure, to protect the
municipality and its officers from claims of lost or stolen goods, and to
protect the public from vandals who might find a firearm or drugs.3 6 The
goals are laudable. It is important to note, however, that there is no
Supreme Court authority granting an across-the-board right to inventory
vehicles.
In South Dakota v. Opperman,3 7 the Supreme Court agreed that police
had the right to inventory impounded vehicles. It did not grant that right
for non-impounded vehicles, nor did the court extend that right to cases
where the owner.of the car is at hand. The dissent in Opperman strongly
argued, and the majority did not disagree, that in such a case the owner
of the car should be able to dictate what would happen to his property.
The courts in Foreman and Williams assumed that the inventory search
was valid, and the evidence therefore was in "plain view." This assumption, however, completely disregards the language employed by the
United States Supreme Court in Opperman.
Foreman raises a further question concerning the proper extent of an
inventory search. The court in Foreman distinguished State v. Ruffino,3"
in which the New Mexico Supreme Court held that when evidence is
discovered during an inventory search, "a search warrant should normally
be obtained prior to seizing the evidence." 39 The court in Foreman held
this language to be inapplicable to the facts before it because this case
involved contraband and not mere "evidence. "' The court held Ruffino
did not alter the "plain view" doctrine, and that under Coolidge, the
goods were seizable. 4 This analysis by the court completely fails to
address the more important aspect of the seizure that was raised by
35. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
36. See State v. Ruflino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980).
37. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
38. 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
39. Id. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313.
40. 97 N.M. at 584, 642 P.2d at 187. The court also intimated that because the quoted language
only noted that a warrant "should" be obtained, the supreme court might not have been stating a
rule of constitutional dimension, but was "simply expressing a preference .. " Id. at 585, 642
P.2d at 188. The court did not have to rule on this distinction because of the court's ultimate holding.
41. Although the court did not expressly refer to Coolidge, the fact that the evidence was patently
illegal made it "clearly evidence of a crime." See supra note 29.
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counsel: assuming the police were justified in performing an inventory
search, a second issue is whether they had the right to open a closed
container.
The Supreme Court has never held that an inventory search justified
excursions into closed containers. Though the Court in United States v.
42
ROSS did hold that an automobile search based on probable cause authorized a search into any container that might contain the sought after
evidence, the Court authorized that further search only to the extent that
the search was supported by probable cause. An inventory search, however, is not based on probable cause. The police, not seeking evidence
of a crime or contraband, should accord the container the. higher protection
of privacy it was granted in Robbins v. California.4' As none of the reasons
justifying an inventory search justify intrusion into the container, the
court in Foreman should have excluded the evidence.
The final two cases dealing with the "plain view" doctrine involved a
challenge that the officer was not lawfully present at the viewing. These
claims stem from the United States Supreme Court's holding in Payton
v. New York' that arrest is a form of seizure, and that it was "unreasonable" to effect a routine felony arrest in the defendant's home absent a
warrant.
The defendant in State v. Pool" was apparently an unwanted guest of
a motel in Eunice, New Mexico.' The owner of the motel, with an officer
present, knocked on the motel door. The defendant opened the door, saw
the police officer, and closed the door. The officer believed he smelled
marijuana burning, so he opened the door and went in. The officer found
court
an alligator clip with a "burned substance" in its teeth. The trial
47
convicted the defendant for possession of narcotic paraphernalia after
it refused to suppress the items found in the hotel room. On appeal, the
court held the exigencies of the moment justified the entry, and that the
entry was supported by probable cause.
Quoting at length from State v. Sanchez," the court held that Payton
applied only to routine arrests and was not applicable where exigencies
42. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
43. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
44. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
45. 98 N.M. 704, 652 P.2d 254 (1982).
46. The officer in Pool was summoned by the owner/ manager of the motel to remove a trespasser.
The room indicated by the owner was occupied by the defendant and the trespasser. Id. at 705, 652
P.2d at 255. The court held at the outset that the rules applying to police authority to enter a private
home were applicable to the entry into the motel room. Id. at 706, 652 P.2d at 256. See also United
States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
47. A later related search disclosed a small amount of marijuana. It was discovered pursuant to
the officer's return to the motel room at the defendant's request.
48. 88 N.M. 402, 540 P.2d 1291 (1975).
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would make a delay for a search warrant fruitless. The court held that
the officer had probable cause based upon the smell of marijuana. 49 It
also found the officer reasonably could have expected the defendant to
destroy the evidence after seeing the police, and that the officer was
justified in acting swiftly and without a warrant.
The final case dealt with an entry into defendant's home for the explicit
purpose of arresting him on a charge of rape. The court in State v. Chavez"
again rejected a claim under Payton, holding instead that the nature of
the crime itself gave the police reason to believe that the suspect might
seek to flee and justified a warrantless entry into his home. 1 The court
held that because the police were lawfully present, evidence of the crime
that was visible as they effected the arrest was in "plain view." 5 2
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT
"[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. . . .,,"
Not only does the fifth amendment protect against requiring self-incrimination, it also protects against drawing inferences based on the
exercise of this right. In three cases decided during the Survey year, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals dealt with allegations that this allied right
had been trammeled by comments made by counsel for the state or by a
witness for the state.
The first of these cases, State v. Mirabal,4 involved a comment by a
witness during a trial for robbery. The arresting officer was testifying
about the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest. The officer
identified the defendant as one of the persons he arrested, and volunteered
that he "read them their Miranda Warnings, ...
(and) asked them if
they had anything to say about it. They refused."5 5 The defendant objected
to this reference to the exercise of his right against self-incrimination,
49. 98 N.M. at 76, 652 P.2d at 256. See also State v. Sandoval, 92 N.M. 476, 590 P.2d 175
(Ct. App. 1979).
50. 98 N.M. 61, 644 P.2d 1050 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
51. The defendant in the case was charged with, and convicted of, rape. The victim was forced
into the defendant's truck and taken to his home. While there he beat and tortured her, and committed
three acts of criminal sexual penetration in the first degree. About five hours after her abduction,
she escaped while the defendant dozed.
The court held the warrantless arrest was justified based on these facts. The victim was able to
identify the defendant, his home, and his truck. Once he realized she had escaped, it was probable
that he would try to flee to avoid punishment. Id. at 63-64, 644 P.2d at 1052-53.
52. During the brief search for the defendant in his home, the police saw a number of items
eventually used as evidence, including bloody sheets, towels, newspapers, and the victim's shoes.
Id. at 62, 644 P.2d at 1051.
53. U.S. Const. amend. V.
54. 98 N.M. 130, 645 P.2d 1386 (Ct. App. 1982).
55. Id. at 132, 645 P.2d at 1388.
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and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but did offer
a curative instruction.6
On appeal the defendant urged that the comment was plain error and
required reversal. He relied on State v. Lara,5 7 where the court held that
"[i]f the defendant's silence lacks significant probative value, the reference to silence has an intolerable prejudicial impact requiring reversal. "58 Under this analysis the comment would warrant reversal. Lara,
however, involved a comment made in direct response to a question about
the defendant's silence, and in State v. Baca,59 the supreme court limited
Lara to its particular facts.
Under the Baca analysis a mistrial is mandated only when the prosecutor "is directly responsible for the improper comment. . .. "I The
Baca court rejected any rule that automatically required a mistrial if
counsel commented on the defendant's silence, holding instead that plain
error occurs only when the state intentionally solicits such evidence. The
reference in Mirabalwas not at the prosecutor's insistence, and therefore,
the court held the comment was not plain error and that it was cured by
the judge's instruction.
Two cases involved a comment by the prosecutor made during the
course of the prosecutor's closing argument. In State v. Martinez,6 the
sole comment claimed as error was the prosecutor's remark that there
had been no contradictory testimony as to what had happened. Relying
on State v. Aguirie62 and State v. Montoya,63 the court quickly disposed
of the claim of unfair comment by holding that the comment did not
implicate the defendant's fifth amendment right because such a comment
did not improperly refer to plaintiff's failure to testify.
The court addressed a more troublesome comment in State v. Ramirez.'
The prosecutor's closing argument in that case directly referred to defendant's silence:
Nowhere during this period of time does this defendant come forward
and most of all, nowhere does he come forward and produce the gun
that can acquit him or maybe show he didn't fire the fatal shot.65
Relying on the language from both Lara and Baca, the court held that
Ramirez' fifth amendment right had been violated because the prosecutor
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
88 N.M. 233, 539 P.2d 623 (Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 235, 539 P.2d at 625 (citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)).
89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976).
Id. at 205, 549 P.2d at 283.
98 N.M. 27, 644 P.2d 541 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
84 N.M. 376, 503 P.2d 1154 (1972).
91 N.M. 752, 580 P.2d 973 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978).
98 N.M. 268, 648 P.2d 307 (1982).
Id. at 267, 648 P.2d at 308.
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was "directly responsible" for the comment on the accused's silence.
The court rejected the state's argument that the defendant waived any
error when no timely objection was offered, holding instead that the direct
reference constituted plain error that could be raised for the first time on
appeal. 6
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT
The sixth amendment affords a defendant many protections related to
and including the right to a jury trial. 67 A number of cases decided during
the Survey year dealt with issues that touched on these rights.
A. The Right to a Trial by an Impartial Jury
1. Discovery.
The right to a meaningful trial necessarily carries with it the right to
know not only the nature of the charges, but also the specific evidence
that will be used. In two cases, the New Mexico courts explored the rules
that deal with the state's obligation to make its evidence known.
6 the defendant appealed his conviction of several
In State v. Tomlinson,"
felonies, on the grounds that the state had violated his sixth amendment
rights by not providing him with a list of witnesses that it would call
until just before trial. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's arguments, holding that sanctions for violations of disclosure rules were
within the lower court's discretion. The court found that the evidence
was not necessarily prejudicial because it was neither technical nor cumulative, holding instead that the defendant had the burden to establish
prejudice. 69 The court further noted that the exclusion of evidence was a
most severe remedy, and reversal would not be appropriate for its refusal.
The defendant instead should have sought a lesser remedy.
The second case dealing with discovery in the context of the sixth
amendment was State v. Sandoval.7" The defendant argued that the state
66. Id.
67. U.S. Const. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
68. 98 N.M. 337, 648 P.2d 795 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 N.M. 213, 647 P.2d 415
(1982).
69. Defendant rested his argument on State v. Quintana, 86 N.M. 666, 526 P.2d 808 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 86 N.M. 656, 526 P.2d 798 (1974).
70. 99 N.M. 173, 655 P.2d 1017 (1982).

Winter 1984]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

violated Rule 27 of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure7' by
failing to notify the defense of two inconsistent statements made by one
of the state's witnesses. The defendant further argued that this violation
prejudiced the case. 7 2 The court employed a four-part analysis to determine whether the allegations warranted a reversal. First, the court questioned whether the state had either breached some duty it owed to the
defendant or intentionally deprived the defendant of evidence; second, it
considered the materiality of the evidence; next, it asked whether the
defendant had been prejudiced; and finally, it examined whether the trial
court cured the state's failure to disclose evidence.73
The court dealt quickly with the first two inquiries, finding the state
clearly had a duty to disclose and that the earlier statements were indeed
material. The third inquiry was one of constitutional analysis. The standard employed by the court was whether the omitted evidence would
have created a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist. 74 The
court then reviewed the witness's earlier statement and concluded that
although he had said the defendant was not present when the beating of
the victim began, Sandoval later joined the group that was doing the
beating. Although this testimony might suggest that Sandoval did not
take part in all aspects of the murder, it does not create a reasonable
doubt that he was not involved. The court also held that the state's failure
to disclose the inconsistent statements did not prejudice the defendant
and hence did not mandate reversal. The court found this conclusion
71. Rule 27, in relevant part, provides:
a) INFORMATION SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE
[Wlithin ten days after arraignment ... the state shall disclose or make available to the defendant:
(6) EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.
Any material evidence favorable to the defendant which the state is required
to produce under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
72. The facts in Sandoval are a bit confusing: Sandoval was charged with beating a fellow inmate
to death. Fuentes, the witness, had been sexually abused by Sandoval on a number of occasions.
The defense made a conscious decision to not try to impeach Fuentes on this ground, feeling instead
that evidence on the sexual abuse would prejudice a jury against Sandoval.
The defense later learned, however, that one of the earlier statements made by Fuentes was that
Sandoval was sexually abusing Fuentes when the killing began. The defense argued that had it
known this, the entire strategy of the trial would have changed. 99 N.M. at 174, 655 P.2d at 1018.
73. The first three prongs of this test came from State v. Lovato, 94 N.M. 780, 617 P.2d 169
(Ct. App. 1980). It did not deal with the fourth inquiry because it involved evidence that had been
destroyed and hence never introduced.
74. 99 N.M. at 175, 655 P.2d at 1019 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)). The
court in Agurs held only that when a defendant makes a general request for information, the prosecutor
is under a constitutional obligation only to disclose evidence that would create a reasonable doubt.
427 U.S. at 113. The court in Sandoval held that Rule 27 requires no more than the general request
in Agurs and hence the same standard should apply. 99 N.M. at 175, 655 P.2d at 1019. This analysis
leaves open the question whether a stricter analysis will be the appropriate guide in determining
prejudice if a more specific request for evidence is made.
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supported by its analysis of the fourth prong, noting that once the state
disclosed this evidence, the trial court granted the defense a continuance
to evaluate the statements.
2. The Role of the Jury
Three cases decided during the Survey year dealt with the role that
jurors play in making determinations in criminal trials. In State v. Ennis"
and State v. Vallejos," the court of appeals addressed the issue of what
use a jury could make of the fact that a defendant had not called witnesses
to testify in his behalf.
In Vallejos, the defendant testified that he could not have committed
the crime because he was drinking with friends at the time. During closing
argument, the prosecutor commented on the fact that the defendant had
not called his friends to corroborate his story. The defendant argued that
the effect of this comment was to imply that the defense had the burden
of proving the accused's innocence, and thus improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
The court of appeals disagreed, and sustained the trial court's ruling.
The court held that because the judge had instructed the jury that the
burden of proof properly rested with the state, the prosecutor's comment
did not modify the court's instruction. Further, the court noted that although the inference sought by the prosecutor, that the defendant did not
call witnesses because their testimony would be unfavorable, might or
might not be proper, it was an inference that could be urged by either
side and thus was a "mere matter of argument."" Based on this premise,
the court concluded that the jury could properly estimate the value of
such arguments.
The court clarified this analysis in State v. Ennis.78 The prosecutor there
made a remark similar to that made in Vallejos, noting that Ennis had
not called the person who could clear him. The defendant objected on
the grounds that New Mexico law permits an inference that testimony of
witnesses not called would be unfavorable only if it was within the power
of the party to produce the witness." The only evidence presented by
either side regarding the witness in question was the defendant's claim
that he did not know where the witness could be found. Ennis argued
that because the uncontroverted evidence showed the witness was not
within his power to produce, the prosecutor's inference was improper.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
1969);

99 N.M. 117, 654 P.2d 570 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982).
98 N.M. 798, 653 P.2d 174 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982).
98 N.M. at 801, 653 P.2d at 177.
99 N.M. 117, 654 P.2d 570 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982).
99 N.M. at 120, 654 P.2d at 573. See State v. Soliz, 80 N.M. 297, 454 P.2d 779 (Ct. App.
2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 285-88 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979).
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The court rejected the argument, agreeing only that a jury instruction
regarding inferences Would be improper under the circumstances. Relying
on Vallejos, the court reasoned that "it is for the jury to properly estimate
the value of the attorneys' argument[s]," 8' and therefore, counsel still
could present their arguments to the jury in an effective manner.
A third case dealing with the role of the jury dealt with the issue
whether the judge or the jury properly should make a determination. In
State v. Gallegos,"1 the defendant appealed his conviction of perjury,
arguing that the judge had interfered with the accused's right to have a
jury trial. One of the elements of perjury is the making of a "material"
statement. In Gallegos, the trial court took it upon itself to decide whether
the particular statement was material. The court of appeals relied on the
"overwhelming weight of authority" and agreed that the decision properly
82
rested with the court.
B. The Right to a Speedy Trial
In State v. Tollardo,83 the defendant claimed that the magistrate court
lost jurisdiction over her when it failed to hold a preliminary hearing
within twenty days after her initial appearance. Citing Rule 15(d) of the
New Mexico Magistrate Rules of Criminal Procedure,84 the defendant
argued the requirement that the preliminary hearing "shall" be held within
that time was mandatory.
The court of appeals noted that "shall" is normally interpreted by the
courts to be a mandatory word, but held that such an interpretation in
this case would be inconsistent with Rule 3(b). Rule 3(b) gives a magistrate authority to enlarge the time for any action save the time of commencement of trial or the time for taking an appeal. The court held the
magistrate properly exercised his discretion in this case 8 and, because
the defendant failed to show any prejudice as a result of the delay, the
court remanded for reinstatement of the charges.
80. 99 N.M. at 120, 654 P.2d at 573. The court in Ennis agreed with the defendant that the
inference sought by the state was invalid, but found that because it was only argument, the defendant
was not prejudiced by it. He was free to point out the invalidity of the argument.
81. 98 N.M 31, 644 P.2d 545 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982).
82. Every jurisdiction except New York and Massachusetts has found that the decision is properly
made by the court. See cases cited at 98 N.M. at 32, 644 P.2d at 546.
83. 99 N.M. 115, 654 P.2d 568 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982).
84. Rule 15(d) provides:
A preliminary hearing shall
be held within a reasonable time but inany event not
later
than ten days following the initial appearance ifthe defendant isincustody
and no later
than twenty days ifhe isnot incustody. Failure to comply with the
time limits setforth inthis
paragraph shall
not affect
the validity of any indictment
for the same criminal offense.
85. The hearing was rescheduled by the magistrate so that he would be free to attend a judicial
conference. The court of appeals found this constituted good cause. 99 N.M. at 117, 654 P.2d at
570.
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In State v. Santillanes,6 the defendant appealed his conviction as a
habitual criminal on the ground that the delay in bringing him to trial
violated his right to a speedy trial. The defendant pled nolo contendre to
a charge of larceny in October of 1978. In return for his plea, the prosecutor agreed not to file a habitual criminal proceeding against him, based
on several conditions.87 In July 1981, the defendant was charged with a
crime that violated the agreement. The day after he was convicted of the
charge, he also was convicted of being an habitual criminal.
The defendant argued that the delay of thirty-two months violated his
rights to a speedy trial and due process and was presumptively prejudicial.
The court rejected his claim, however, and held that the period prior to
filing a charge is not to be considered in determining whether there has
been a violation of the right to a speedy trial.8 The time before that date
was unimportant.
C. The Right to Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel carries with it
the right to have counsel present at all critical stages of a prosecution,
including custodial interrogation.8 9 This right was involved in State v.
Dominguez.9 The police suspected the defendant in Dominguez of having
shot at a vehicle. While still in the custody of the County Sheriff, Dominguez contacted a law firm and engaged it to represent him in the
matter. The law firm contacted the state police and advised them that he
had counsel. The sheriff's department then transported the defendant to
the state police, and they in turn read the defendant his rights as required
by Miranda v. Arizona." The defendant informed the police that he would
make no statement until he had met with his counsel. Approximately
three-and-a-half hours later the same officer who had been with Dominguez earlier asked the defendant to make a statement.92 Dominguez
86. 98 N.M. 448, 649 P.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1982).
87. The agreement provided that the state could file the habitual proceedings if the defendant
violated any condition of release or committed any other crime. The court accepted his plea and
sentenced him to two years of unsupervised probation. Id. at 450, 649 P.2d at 518.
88. Id. (citing State v. Tafoya, 91 N.M. 121, 570 P.2d 1148 (Ct. App. 1977); N.M. R. Crim.
P. 37).
89. The protection against self-incrimination during investigation extends only to "custodial
interrogation"; questions or other conduct designed to solicit an incriminating response from a person
subject to control by the police. Note that the protections afforded by the sixth amendment are quite
similar to those granted by the fifth amendment. The sixth amendment grants the right to counsel
before being subjected to the criminal process; the fifth amendment grants the right to remain silent
even after counsel has been retained. Many of the cases construing fifth amendment rights have been
found controlling in sixth amendment cases. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. 97 N.M. 592, 642 P.2d 195 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982).
91. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
92. The officer involved was not only the same officer whom the defendant earlier told he would
not speak without his counsel present, but was also the same officer that Dominguez' counsel spoke
with when he called the state police. 97 N.M. at 593, 642 P.2d at 196.
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complied, offering a written statement that implicated him. Dominguez
later claimed that this statement was in violation of his right to have
counsel.
Relying on Miranda v. Arizona9 3 and State v. Word,9 4 the court of
appeals held that once a defendant indicates that he wishes to consult an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. The officer's request that Dominguez "make a statement" was "likely to evoke an incriminating response," 95 and was thus custodial interrogation. Having
decided that the statement was the product of interrogation, the court
turned to the state's claim that the defendant had waived his right to
counsel. The apparent basis for the state's argument was the combination
of the lapse of time, the innocuous nature of the investigating officer's
question, the defendant's familiarity with his rights, and the fact that the
statement was given voluntarily.'
The court rejected this "totality of the circumstances" approach, and
created an absolute rule. Relying on Edwards v. Arizona,97 the court held
that showing that a statement was made voluntarily does not address the
question of whether the defendant waived his right to counsel. The court
held that once a defendant has expressed his desire to have counsel
present, the police must cease custodial interrogation. Only if the defendant himself initiates further communication may the police press the
issue at all. In Dominguez, the court found there was no waiver because
the police gained the damaging evidence as a result of custodial interrogation initiated by the police after a request for counsel.
V. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
In State v. Garcia,98 the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New Mexico Capital Felony Sentencing Act." In
finding the Act permissable, the court almost summarily relied on United
States Supreme Court precedent to uphold the act. The court first cited
to Gregg v. Georgia"° and State v. Rondeau'' for the proposition that
the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual. The court then noted
that this particular statute is constitutional because it is modeled after
statutes that have withstood the scrutiny of the United States Supreme
Court. 102
93. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. 80 N.M. 377, 456 P.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1969).
95. 97 N.M. at 593, 642 P.2d at 196.
96. Id. at 594, 642 P.2d at 197.
97. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
98. 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2464 (1983).
99. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§31-20A-1 to 31-20A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
100. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
101. 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976).
102. 99 N.M. at 777, 664 P.2d at 975. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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The only serious consideration the court gave to the attack on the
statute was in passing on the claim that the jury instructions would serve
only to confuse the jury and leave them unapprised as to how they should
decide whether to impose the death penalty."°3 Under the Act, a jury can
impose the death penalty only if it finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
one or more of the specific aggravating circumstances charged had occurred." °4 Once a jury so finds, it must then balance the aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating circumstances,1o5 and decide whether
a life sentence or the death penalty shall be imposed. The court found
the jury instructions to be clear enough to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The final point addressed by the court concerned whether the sentence
imposed in Garcia was "excessive and/or disproportionate" in comparison to that of Garcia's co-defendant. 6 Garcia relied on the Act, which
provides that the death penalty should not be imposed if the sentence
would be excessive or disproportionate relative to the penalty imposed
17
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.' The
court rejected Garcia's claim, noting that Garcia started the fight and
"intentionally and unmercifully" stabbed the guard in the back while he
was being held by the other defendant. The court held that the conduct
of the two defendants was different enough to warrant different treatment.
In reaching this result, the court set forth guidelines by which it would
decide similar claims in the future. In deciding whether a sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate, the court will review as follows:
1. We will review this issue only when raised on appeal.
2. In our review, we will consider only New Mexico cases in which
a defendant has been convicted of capital murder under the SAME
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE(S).
3. Only those New Mexico cases in which a defendant was convicted
under the same aggravating circumstance(s) and then received
EITHER the death penalty OR life imprisonment and whose con103. Although the court reviewed the jury instructions and found "no fault" with them, it further
noted that the objections could not be raised on appeal because the defendant had not objected to
them at trial. The court specifically noted that just because the penalty of death could be imposed,
submission of an erroneous jury instruction did not become fundamental error. 99 N.M. at 779, 664
P.2d at 977.
104. The aggravating circumstances upon which a death penalty can be based are limited to those
set out in the statute. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
105. Unlike aggravating circumstances, mitigating factors are not defined or limited by statute.
The court rejected the defendant's claim that mitigating circumstances must be specified in a clear
and objective standard, finding that a judge or jury should be able to take in an unlimited variety
of considerations in deciding to spare one's life. 99 N.M. at 778-79, 664 P.2d at 978-79.
106. Garcia's co-defendant, Jesse Trujillo, had been involved in the scuffle that cost the lives of
a prison guard and a fellow inmate. 99 N.M. at 779, 664 P.2d at 979.
107. See supra note 105.
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viction and sentence have been upheld previously by this Court,
will be considered appropriate for comparison.
4. We will review the record and compare the facts of the offense
and all other evidence presented by way of aggravation or mitigation to determine whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate.108
VI. SENTENCING

A number of cases decided during the Survey year dealt with issues
involving sentences. Only a few, however, significantly affected the law,
so many will be treated briefly or only cited for the reader's reference.
A. Allocutus
The defendant in Tomlinson v. State,1o9 convicted of three counts of
kidnapping and one count of robbery, appealed from his sentence on the
ground that he had not had a chance to speak before the court passed
sentence. Relying on a statute providing for a sentencing hearing,"O the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that such a hearing was mandatory and
that it impliedly granted the defendant a right to speak. The court reasoned
that the Legislature was aware of this right and intended to include it."'
B. Plea BargainAgreements
The defendant in State v. Sykes" 2 entered into a plea and disposition
agreement with the state in which defendant pled guilty to burglary and
larceny and agreed to waive extradition proceedings on charges in Nevada.' 13 In turn, the court imposed the agreed upon sentence: two concurrent three-year terms followed by a two-year probation. The defendant
still had to face the Nevada charges; therefore, the plea agreement also
provided that the sentence imposed in New Mexico would run concur108. 99 N.M. at 780, 664 P.2d at 980. The court examined early United States cases at some
length to justify this standard of review. Id. The reader is recommended to the case for a detailed
background because an abstract of the case can never fully describe its subject. Id.
109. 98 N.M. 213, 647 P.2d 415 (1982).
110. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). The statute itself does not provide for
the right to be heard, but only for consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both
the trial court and the court of appeals found substantial compliance with the statute because the
court had listened to all the evidence and was familiar with mitigating evidence. 98 N.M. at 214,
647 P.2d at 416.
111. The court reasoned that any other result would be in derogation of common law because
the right of allocutus was so favored at common law. Id. at 214-15, 647 P.2d at 416-17.
As to the right of allocutus generally, note that the court rejected the state's argument that it was
harmless error in this case. Although the court did not expressly so hold, it implied the doctrine of
harmless error would never be applicable where allocutus has been denied. Id.
112. 98 N.M. 458, 649 P.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1982).
113. Id. at 459, 649 P.2d at 763.
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4
rently with any "time to be served as a result of conviction in Nevada.""1
When the defendant surrendered himself to Nevada authorities, he pled
guilty pursuant to another plea bargain agreement. The Nevada court
sentenced the defendant to one year in prison, but suspended the sentence
and placed him on three years' probation in Nevada. The New Mexico
court, realizing that no prison time would be imposed in Nevada, had
the defendant returned and imprisoned. The defendant appealed, arguing
that the state violated the plea bargain.
The court of appeals agreed, holding that the state could not change
the sentence. The agreement must be upheld or rejected as an entire unit.
New Mexico could not now seek to rescind the agreement to the further
detriment of the defendant because the defendant already had relied on
the agreement by pleading guilty and voluntarily submitting to charges
in Nevada. The court further held that although the result of the agreement
was not what the state expected, it nonetheless had to accept it. The state
had promised the defendant that three years of service to New Mexico
would be concurrent with three years of service to Nevada. If Nevada
chose to order probation instead of incarceration, that decision bound
New Mexico as well.
A second case dealing with abiding by plea bargains showed the flip
side of the coin. In State v. Bazan,'15 the court held a defendant could
not appeal a conviction based on a plea bargain." 6 The defendant pled
guilty to driving while intoxicated, second offense, as part of a plea
agreement. The court imposed a six-month sentence and the defendant
appealed to district court, seeking a trial de novo.
The court held the defendant had waived his right to appeal. Relying
on Baird v. State,'17 the court held that the clause in the agreement that
waived the defendant's right to appeal was valid."' The court also held

114. Id.
115. 97 N.M. 531, 641 P.2d 1078 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039 (1982).
116. Bazan actually dealt with an appeal from the conviction, not just the sentence. It has been
included in this section for purpose of clarity.
117. 90 N.M. 667, 568 P.2d 193 (1977).
118. Two pertinent provisions of the agreement in Bazan were set out by the court at length:
Unless this plea is rejected or withdrawn, that the defendant hereby gives up
any and all motions, defenses, objections or requests which he has made or
raised, or could assert hereafter, to be the court's entry of judgment against
him and imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this agreement. ...
I have read and understand the above. I have discussed the case and my
constitutional rights with my lawyer. I understand that by pleading (guilty) (no
contest) I will be giving up my right to a trial by jury, to confront, crossexamine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, and my privilege against
self-incrimination. I agree to enter my plea as indicated above on the terms
and conditions set forth herein[.]
97 N.M. at 532, 641 P.2d at 1079.
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that because the defendant did not attempt to withdraw his plea or to
allege error in the agreement, he was bound by its provisions.
C. Restitution
Section 3 1-17-1 of New Mexico Statutes Annotated' 1 9 provides that a
court may require a person convicted of a crime to make restitution to
the victims of the crime of which he was convicted. Several cases decided
during the Survey year defined both the extent of court-ordered restitution
and the procedures involved in its application.
In State v. Lack, 20 the defendant appealed from an order of restitution.
The court's analysis of this claim provides some insight into the procedures the court must follow in imposing such a sentence. It first noted
that a court could require restitution as a condition of parole or probation.
The defendant's failure to comply with a lawful order of restitution in
that situation would then constitute a violation of probation or parole.
In ordering restitution, the court must require the defendant, in cooperation with his parole or probation officer, to prepare a plan of restitution, including the specific amount to be paid to each victim as well
as a schedule of payment. The court in Lack held that this procedure is
necessary in order to satisfy requirements of due process; to give the
defendant notice of the amount of restitution claimed, the opportunity to
dispute the amount, and to question his ability to pay.'21 Final order to
pay, however, must be made by the court and not by the parole or probation
officer. A report by such officer, however, would aid the court in making
this determination.
A full evidentiary hearing is not required in making a final determination. The court in Lack specifically noted that the rules of evidence
did not apply, and further, that the amount of restitution need not be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.' 22 The court did state, however, that the defendant had the right to be sentenced on the basis of
accurate information. If a defendant disputes any information in the report, therefore, he may question its accuracy at a sentencing hearing.' 2 3
119. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-17-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
120. 98 N.M. 500, 650 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 1391 (1982).
121. Id. at 509, 649 P.2d at 31. Although the defendant in Lack was not afforded the procedure
required by the statute, the court refused to reverse on that ground because he failed to present that
issue on appeal. The court apparently applied a harmless error rule of sorts, for it reviewed the facts
justifying the amount and the defendant's ability to pay. Further, the court noted that he had access
to a pre-sentence report that apprised him of the amounts claimed and also noted that the court gave
him the opportunity to dispute the amounts ordered. Id.
122. 98 N.M. at 506, 650 P.2d at 26.
123. Id. Note that an order of restitution is mandatory when a sentence is either deferred or
suspended, but may be imposed even if the full sentence is imposed. See State v. Ennis, 99 N.M.
117, 654 P.2d 570 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982); State v. Gross, 98
N.M. 309, 648 P.2d 348 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
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VII. RULES OF PROCEDURE
Appealing from a conviction of three felony counts, the defendant in
State v. Casteneda2 4 argued that a new trial should be ordered because
the state's witness committed perjury. To establish his claim the defendant
pointed to inconsistencies between the witness's testimony and that of
other witnesses. The court of appeals rejected his plea on two grounds.
First, the court noted that an order for a new trial was inappropriate
because the defendant failed to bring the claim before the trial court.
Relying on Rule 308 of the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure, 2 5
the court held the failure to alert the trial court in a timely manner as to
the claim of perjury waived the right to appeal on that ground. Second,
the court held that the defendant failed to establish a right to a new trial.
The defendant had established only inconsistencies. To warrant a new
trial, a defendant must establish perjury of a material fact by evidence
that is so "clear and convincing

. . .

as to leave no reasonable doubt that

perjury was committed."' 26
State v. Chavez 27 concerned the propriety of a new trial granted by
the court on its own motion. After the defendant was convicted on two
counts of first-degree murder, one count of aggravated battery, and one
count of carrying a firearm in a licensed liquor establishment, the court,
sua sponte, ordered a new trial.' 2 8 On appeal the state argued'2 9 that Rule
45 of the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure does allow such an
order, but instead requires that an order granting a new trial must be
accompanied by a written or oral statement setting forth the reasons for
the new trial. The supreme court held that the trial court's reference to
the interests of justice referred to the standard relied on, but not the
grounds for the order. Finding the mandates of Rule 45 were not met,
the court remanded the case for action consistent with Rule 45.
Although new trials are permitted under Rule 45, a judgment n.o.v.
124. 97 N.M. 670, 642 P.2d 1129 (Ct. App. 1982).
125. N.M. R. Crim. App. P. 308. See also State v. Hogervorst, 90 N.M. 580, 566 P.2d 828 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977).
126. 97 N.M. at 678, 642 P.2d at 1137.
127. 98 N.M. 682, 652 P.2d 232 (1982).
128. The trial court did not make it clear why it was granting the new trial. It noted that the
evidence was conflicting and held that, "in the interest of justice," a new trial would be granted
pursuant to N.M. R. Crim. P. 45.
The state argued that the new trial was improper because it was granted because a juror later
impeached the verdict. The supreme court agreed that it is improper to allow a jury to impeach its
verdict (see N.M. R. Evid. 606(b)), but held the court did not grant the new trial on that ground,
but solely on the basis of Rule 45(a). 98 N.M. at 683-84, 652 P.2d at 233-34.
129. A second issue in the case was whether the state had the right to appeal. The defendant
argued that the state was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of article VI, section 2 of the
New Mexico Constitution. This section limits appeals to be taken only by an aggrieved party. The
supreme court held the state was an aggrieved party, noting the state's interest in upholding a lawful
jury verdict. 98 N.M. at 683, 582 P.2d at 233.
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is not a tool available to a trial judge in a criminal case. The defendant
' convicted of larceny, moved for and received a
in State v. Davis, 30
judgment of acquittal, notwithstanding the verdict. The state appealed,
arguing that such a judgment was not proper.
The court of appeals agreed with the state. It noted that a judgment
n.o.v. is permitted by the Rules of Civil Procedure, but is not mentioned
in the Criminal Rules.' The court reasoned that Rule 40(e)' 32 requires
the court to determine the sufficiency of the state's evidence at the close
of its case. The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of
the state's case and after the defense rested. The trial court took both
motions under advisement. The appellate court, however, noted that the
rules do not provide for taking such motions under advisement. The court
held it must be deemed to have denied the motion because it could not
take the motion under advisement and it did not grant the motion. The
court further noted that Rule 46 requires a court to enter a judgment of
guilty if the defendant is so found. " The court held this placed a mandatory duty on the trial judge. The case was remanded with instructions
to reinstate the jury verdict because the trial court did not fulfill its duty.'34
The defendants in State v. Stephens'35 were convicted of the first-degree
murder of a fellow inmate. Seven months after their conviction, Michael
Price executed a warrant confessing that he alone had killed the decedent
and that the defendants had nothing to do with the crime. 3 6 Based on
the affidavit and other evidence, 37 the defendants moved for a new trial.
The court denied the defendant's motion, and the judgment was upheld
on appeal when the supreme court found the evidence to be merely
cumulative. The legal footwork involved in getting to the supreme court's
finding is extremely questionable, however, and serves only to undermine
the court's credibility.
130. 97 N.M. 745, 643 P.2d 614 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d 1391 (1982).
131. 97 N.M. at 747, 643 P.2d at 616. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
132. N.M. R. Crim. P. 40(e).
133. 97 N.M. at 748, 643 P.2d at 617. See N.M. R. Crim. P. 46.
134. 97 N.M. at 748, 643 P.2d at 617. Relying on United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975),
and United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the court held such an order did not offend the
prohibition against double jeopardy, as the defendant would not be subject to another trial. 98 N.M.
at 747-48, 643 P.2d at 616-17.
135. 99 N.M. 32, 653 P.2d 863 (1982).
136. Price had been indicted for the murder as a co-defendant of the parties in Stephens. After
trial of the three had begun, Price was severed as a defendant and granted a separate trial. Before
his trial began, he pled guilty to a reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 34, 653 P.2d
at 865.
137. The other evidence included promises the state had made to the state's witnesses in exchange
for their testimony and evidence that a guard had seen the defendants leave the vicinity of the murder
with no blood stains, which would be inconsistent with the state's case. As to both bits of evidence,
the court held the defendant could have discovered it prior to trial. Id. at 36-38, 653 P.2d at 86769.
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The defendants argued that under State v. Chavez, 138 a new trial must
be ordered. The defendant in Chavez was granted a new trial when, after
the trial, another person confessed to the crime and when two other
eyewitnesses said the defendant had not committed the crime. The court
rejected the argument based on Chavez. It held that Chavez not only had
a later confession, but two witnesses to corroborate it. The court, however,
misread Chavez: neither of the two witnesses indentified the man who
confessed; both men simply said the defendant did not commit the crime.
This is not corroboration, but merely information that makes it more
likely that the confession could be true. It therefore should go only to
the weight of the new evidence.
Citing State v. Valdez, 139 the court stated:

We have held that even if another person was prepared to testify, or
had confessed that he, and not another, had committed a crime for
which another was convicted, that would not be newly discovered
evidence since such person could add nothing to testimony defendant
could have given at trial." to
This statement is not what Valdez held. Valdez did not hold that the
confession of another could not add anything that could not have been
brought up at the first trial. It only held in that particular case, any evidence
relied on for a new trial had been available at the earlier trial.
The case of Stephens is markedly different from Valdez. In Valdez the
defendant knew of the confession before his trial, therefore, it was not
new evidence. The confession in Stephens came to light seven months
after trial. The evidence presented in Stephens was new evidence; it was
evidence not available at the earlier trial. The court's argument that Price's
confession "is merely cumulative of the alibi defense" used by the defendants is without merit. Under such an analysis, any evidence tending
to prove the defendant not guilty would only be cumulative of his claim
that he did not commit the crime.
The court in Stephens correctly noted that the standard to be applied
in motions for new trials is that the new evidence must "probably produce
a new result if a new trial is to be granted.". 4' After concluding that the
confession was not new evidence, the court further stated that the defendants had failed to convince the trial court that a different result would
obtain on retrial. The ruling presents an interesting issue because Price's
confession, if believed, probably would cause a different verdict. The
question, then, is whether a judge may consider the witnesses' credibility.
138.
139.
140.
141.

87 N.M. 38, 528 P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1974).
95 N.M. 70, 618 P.2d 1234 (1980).
Stephens, 99 N.M. at 37, 653 P.2d at 868.
Id. (citing State v. Mabry, 96 N.M. 317, 630 P.2d 269 (1981)).
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The court's decision in Stephens implies an affirmative answer. In distinguishing earlier cases, the court noted that "Price's confession stands
by itself as a rank assertion of criminal involvement . . . without the
benefit of corroboration. "1 4 2 If the court did not hold that such a confession, as a matter of law, is not believable, it at least allowed the trial
court to find it unbelievable.' 4 3

142. The confession in Stephens was corroborated by the two defendants. 99 N.M. at 37, 653
P.2d at 868. Additionally, the testimony of the guard, though not admissible at a later trial, does
buttress the reliability of Price's confession. Finally, the fact that the state promised its witnesses
favored treatment for charges pending against them should show the weakness in the state's case.
Where various factors in a case show the attenuated nature in a case, the court has been willing to
grant a new trial in the past. See State v. Chavez, 87 N.M. 38, 528 P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1974); State
v. Fuentes, 67 N.M. 31, 351 P.2d 209 (1960).
143. The New Mexico courts have never before decided whether the reliability of the evidence
could be considered. In several cases, however, the courts have reversed a denial of a new trial
without inquiring into whether the new evidence was believable. See, e.g., State v. Chavez, 87
N.M. 38, 528 P.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1974). In Chavez, the dissenting judge specifically noted that the
lower court could not deny a new trial simply because he did not believe the new evidence. While
some evidence might be held incredible as a matter of law, a trial court should not deny a new trial
simply because it finds the evidence unbelievable. If the evidence could be believed, the defendant
should be granted a new trial. Id. at 40, 528 P.2d at 899 (Hendley, J., dissenting).

